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NOTES
STATUTORY VISITATION RIGHTS OF
GRANDPARENTS: ONE STEP CLOSER TO THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Traumatic as the death of his mother or father might be, a child learns
to cope with its finality through the support and affection of surviving close
friends and relatives. Often the primary figures in this new world are the
child's grandparents, whose loving concern can replace the bonds of affection
which are likely to have existed between the child and his deceased parent.
Sadly, however, in a significant number of cases, the child is deprived of this
comfort. He finds himself forcibly estranged from his grandparents by increas-
ing hostilities between them and the surviving parent who is striving to restruc-
ture his or her own life. The parent, occasionally with the support of a new
spouse, may choose to sever all contact between the child and his grandpar-
ents.
At common law, with rare exceptions,' grandparents faced with this situa-
tion had no legal alternative other than to challenge the fitness of the cus-
todial parent.2 If the custodial parent was found to be fit, the grandparents
had to accept the decision of the parent and be content with memories of
their grandchildren or brief glimpses of them as the children pursued their
daily activities in public places. Recently, some state legislatures, sympathiz-
ing with the plight of grandparents in this predicament have enacted statutes
creating an independent right of visitation for grandparents 3 Although there
still must be a showing that such visitations are in the best interests of the
child, these statutes have brought new hope to grandparents whose relation-
ships with their grandchildren are warm, but whose ties with the surviving
parent are less than harmonious.
Despite this statutory mandate, however, grandparents still have been un-
able to assert their newly granted right in some of these jurisdictions if the
1. See Mirto v. Bodine, 29 Conn. Supp. 510, 294 A.2d 336 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1962); Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.
2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
3. See note 27 inf ra.
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child has been legally adopted by the new spouse of the surviving parent.
Courts espousing this point of view have found the visitation statute inopera-
tive in view of preexisting adoption statutes which terminate all rights
of natural parents and other blood relatives when a child is adopted.
4
This result, however, is not inevitable. Other courts faced with this
apparent statutory conflict have found grandparents' visitation rights se-
cure despite displacement of their deceased child by an adoptive parent.5
This article will examine these divergent approaches in the context of the re-
medial purposes of the visitation statutes.
I. COMMON LAW: PARENTS As DETERMINERS OF THE
CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS
At common law, the right of the custodial parent to decide whether grand-
parents would be permitted visitation privileges with their grandchildren was
subject to minimal judicial oversight. As a general rule, the right of the par-
ents to control the activities of their children in the home was considered
fundamental and only when parental authority was found to have been
abused would the state intervene. Thus, except in rare cases, grandparents
who attempted to secure visitation privileges through the courts against the
wishes of the parent failed.
Succession of Reiss" is generally recognized as the first case in which a
grandparent actually sued for visitation privileges." While recognizing the
desirability of a close grandparent-grandchild relationship, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana upheld the right of the parent to deny visitations when a conflict
of opinion between parent and grandparent arose.9 A careful reading of
4. See, e.g., Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v.
Trosclair, 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975); DeWeese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Roquemore v. Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432
(1969); Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975), rev'g 125 N.J. Super. 420,
311 A.2d 211 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 106, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (1947), in
which the court enumerated the rights incident to parenthood. One such right was the
right to care and custody of the minor child. The supremacy of the parents in regulating
the child's activities within the home is generally recognized by the courts. See id.;
Ex parte White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 129 P.2d 706 (1942).
7. 46 La. Ann. 347, 15 So. 151 (1894). The maternal grandmother, whose daughter
had died six years before, sought to compel the father to send the two minor grandchil-
dren to visit her at her home at times specified by the court.
8. See Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 474, 477-79
(1973); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 325, 327 (1964).
9. 46 La. Ann. at 352, 15 So. at 152. The court was primarily concerned with the
possibility of undermining parental authority by allowing grandparents to challenge a
parent's decision.
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Reiss suggests two approaches which later courts utilized to deny visitation
rights to grandparents: 1) the parent's obligation to allow a child to visit
his grandparents is a moral, not a legal, one and is, therefore, unenforceable
in the courts; and 2) absent a showing that the custodial parent is unfit, the
court should not interpose iself in visitation controversies.' 0
Subsequently, grandparents seemed unable to clear the initial legal hurdle
of establishing a right to visit their grandchildren, since most jurisdictions
followed one of the Reiss approaches. The court in Smith v. Painter," for
example, followed the first Reiss approach, refusing to allow visitation be-
cause the grandparents had no legal right of action by which to demand it. 12
In several other jurisdictions,' 3 the grandparents have been effectively pre-
cluded from arguing the facts since the visitation issue has been viewed as
a question of law.
Jurisdictions which did not utilize the first Reiss analysis approached the
problem from a fitness-of-the-parent perspective. These courts have focused
on the failure of the grandparents to allege that the custodial parent was unfit
and have used that failure as a basis for denial of visitation rights. 14 Courts
which follow this line of analysis have generally viewed the award of visita-
tion privileges as subject to the same standards as are applied in a custody
proceeding incident to a divorce or separation." In making a custody deter-
mination, the court carefully considers the options before it in light of what
10. See id.
11. 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
1967) (per curiam). The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment after both
sides filed affidavits stating their positions on the visitation issue. Without passing
on the merits of the parties' claims, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
judgment.
12. Accord, Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). The jury in
Green found that it would be in the child's best interests to grant the grandparents
reasonable visitation privileges. The trial court, however, reversed the jury's verdict,
ruling that the grandparents, as a matter of law, were not entitled to visitation privileges.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's holding.
13. See, e.g., Veazey v. Stewart, 251 Ark. 334, 472 S.W.2d 102 (1971); Odell v.
Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947). For a compilation of cases from
various jurisdictions that utilize this approach, see Gault, supra note 8, at 480.
14. See, e.g., Kay v. Kay, 51 Ohio Op. 434, 112 N.E.2d 562 (1953) (custodial
parents not alleged to be unfit could make visitation decision); People ex rel Schachter v.
Kahn, 241 App. Div. 686, 269 N.Y.S. 173 (1934) (per curiam) (habeas corpus
proceeding brought by maternal grandmother against custodial father dismissed for
failure to allege unfitness). But see Chodzko v. Chodzko, 35 Il1. App. 3d 357, 342
N.E.2d 122 (1975) (maternal grandmother allowed to intervene in child custody
proceedings to secure visitation rights without allegation of unfitness).
15. For a concise overview of the processes of child custody adjudication, see Shep-
herd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions, 8 U. RICH. L. REV.
151 (1974).
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would be most beneficial to the child. 16 The complex interaction of relevant
factors usually makes this determination an especially difficult one unless one
parent is demonstrably unfit. If both parents are unfit, the court may award
custody to a third person, such as a grandparent.1 7  Once custody is awarded
to one parent, the court normally will order reasonable visitation privileges
to the other parent."' Therefore, a logical nexus between visitation and cus-
tody exists, since an award of visitation rights is often an integral part of a
custody determination.
Although the question of fitness is in fact more relevant to the determina-
tion of custody than to the granting of visitation rights, even when both are
litigated in the same proceeding, some courts have carried over the fitness
standard into independent visitation suits by grandparents. 19 In Jackson v.
Fitzgerald,20 for example, the Municipal Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia held that because visitation rights are derived from custody rights,
when the fitness of the custodial parent is not at issue, judicially imposed
visitation impinges on the father's vested custody right.21
One exception to the general common law bar of grandparents' visitation
suits involved visitation requests made pursuant to a divorce proceeding.
Under these circumstances, some courts recognized a limited right of the
grandparent to intervene. 22 The visitation privileges initially granted in this
16. Members of the ABA Family Law Section in a recent survey indicated the
following preferential ranking of factors that should be considered in determining the
best interests of the child: 1) emotional and physical health of the parent, 2) preference
of the child (in light of age, maturity, and motivation), 3) physical environment and
comparison of environments. 2 FAM. L. REP. 2719 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Kees v. Fallen, 207 So. 2d 92 (Miss. 1968); In re Craigo, 266 N.C. 92,
145 S.E.2d 376 (1965); State ex rel. Obrecht v. McClane, 256 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1953).
18. Alternatively, the court may order split or divided custody, but courts are
generally reluctant to do so. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963).
19. In Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947), both the maternal
grandmother and the custodial father and his new wife were fit to raise the child. Even
though no question of custody was involved, since the grandmother sought only reasona-
ble visiting privileges with a child who was her only living descendent, the court still
applied the custody standard and refused to allow visitation on the grounds that the
parent's ability to raise the child was unquestioned. Id. at 107, 177 P.2d at 629. Ac-
cord, Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
The whole fitness argument as applied to visitation questions is something of a charade.
If the grandparents could establish a parent's lack of fitness, they presumably would seek
custody, not visitation. To demand allegations and proof of parental unfitness prior to
entertaining requests for visitation is an effective way of foreclosing grandparent visita-
tion actions.
20. 185 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1962). The lower court dismissed the grandmother's action
for failure to allege parental unfitness or misconduct.
21. Id. at 726.
22. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 154 Ga. 659, 115 S.E.2d (1922); McKinney v. Cox, 18
[Vol. 26:387
Visitation Rights of Grandparents
manner were usually upheld when the custodial parent later challenged
them. 23  In determining whether grandparents' visits should be continued in
the face of parental opposition the courts usually looked to the best interests
of the child rather than assuming that hostilities between parents and grand-
parents automatically indicated that grandchild-grandparent visitation was
counter to the child's best interests. 24
Ill. App. 2d 609 (abstract), 153 N.E.2d 98 (abstract) (1958). Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 325,
328 (1964), discusses this exception, noting that visitation rights generally are given
when the custodial parent either consents or fails to object strenuously thereto. If the
parent for any reason later changes his or her mind and bars the grandparents from
visiting the grandchild, the grandparents' rights are likely to be upheld if they can
demonstrate that a close relationship with the grandchild exists.
Visitation privileges for grandparents have also been upheld even when no prior award
of visitation rights in a divorce proceeding has been made if the grandchild has lived
with the grandparent. In Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, 248 P.2d 425 (1952),
initial custody of the child was given to the mother. Both mother and child resided with
the grandmother until the mother disappeared. The father was then given custody, but
he allowed the grandmother to visit her grandchild until his remarriage. One reason
that the appellate court upheld the visitation was that, in light of the child's three year
residence with the grandmother, the child's best interests required that their close rela-
tionship continue, at least through regular visits. Id. at 532, 248 P.2d at 426. Accord,
Kentera v. Kentera, 66 Cal. App. 2d 373, 152 P.2d 238 (1944); McKinney v. Cox, 18
Ill. App. 2d 609 (abstract), 153 N.E.2d 98 (abstract) (1958); Commonwealth ex rel.
Goodman v. Dratch, 192 Pa. Super. 1, 159 A.2d 70 (1960).
23. See, e.g., Minge v. Minge, 226 Ark. 262, 289 S.W.2d 189 (1956) (visitation
granted at support hearing); Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, 205 So. 2d 903 (1967);
Brookstein v. Brookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970). In some
instances, however, the father has successfully attacked a court order of grandparent
visitation which was incident to a divorce decree and originally accepted by the father.
See Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 85 A.2d 686
(1952) (extensive visitation rights granted in the original order held to amount, in effect,
to improper partial custody); People ex rel. Marks v. Greiner, 249 App. Div. 564, 293
N.Y.S. 364, aff'd, 274 N.Y. 613, 10 N.E.2d 577 (1937) (original order which gave
maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and uncle visitation privileges held improper
when the father, who was a fit guardian of the child, withdrew consent).
24. See, e.g., Boyles v. Boyles, 14 I1. App. 3d 602, 302 N.E.2d 199 (1973);
Commonwealth ex rel. Goodman v. Dratch, 192 Pa. Super. 1, 159 A.2d 70 (1960). All
too frequently, courts had become consumed in legal wranglings and had effectively
ignored the child's best interests. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 154 Ga. 659, 115 S.E.2d
(1922); Weichman v. Weichman, 50 Wis. 2d 73, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971).
An interesting case in which a Pennsylvania court distinguished Goodman is Common-
wealth ex rel. Dogole v. Cherry, 196 Pa. Super, 46, 173 A.2d 650 (1961). In Dogole,
the adoptive mother died and her mother sued for visitation rights upon the father's
remarriage. While the court would have granted visitation to a natural grandparent as it
had in Goodman, it refused to grant the adoptive parent's mother the same right,
reasoning that the grandmother in this case had never had any legal relationship with the
child and functioned as a distant third party under the law. Arguably a different result
would occur today in light of numerous statutes that bestow on adoptive parents all legal
rights of natural parents vis-d-vis the child.
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The case of Mirto v. Bodine25 represents another exception to the usual
common law approach. At issue was whether a grandparents' suit for visita-
tion rights must be tied to a past or pending divorce action. Instead of bar-
ring the grandparents' suit because this was not a divorce proceeding or be-
cause they failed to allege the unfitness of their son-in-law, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut held that the best interests of the child were paramount.
The grandparents were thus entitled to a hearing at which facts relevant to
the child's best interests would be considered. 2 6 The Connecticut approach
is an isolated instance of judicial willingness to recognize the grandparents'
independent right of action.
Apart from these two limited exceptions to the general rule, grandparents
found themselves stymied because they had no traceable legal right to visita-
tion privileges. They were forced, therefore, to look beyond the courts to
find a basis for relief.
II. GRANDPARENTS' VISITATION STATUTES: PANACEA
OR PANDORA'S Box?
Beginning in the late 1960's, a handful of state legislatures, believing that
the treatment received by grandparents at the hands of state courts was in-
equitable, took steps to provide a legal avenue for grandparents to pursue
in securing the visitation privileges they desired. An independent right al-
lowing grandparents to bring habeas corpus actions for visitation privileges
has been established by statute in six states. 2 7 These statutes give trial courts
the discretion to award such privileges upon a showing by the grandparents
that it would be in the best interests of the grandchildren to do so. Theoreti-
cally it is no longer possible in these jurisdictions for the grandparents to suf-
fer dismissal of their suits prior to an adjudication on the merits because their
right to sue is established by law and no allegation of unfitness of the cus-
todial parent is required. Although there is no presumption in favor of visita-
tion, after the trier of fact considers the circumstances of the particular par-
ties, the statutes allow a court to determine impartially the child's best
interest, rather than binding it to the decision of the parent. 28
25. 29 Conn. Supp. 510, 294 A.2d 336 (1972).
26. Id. at 511, 294 A.2d at 337.
27. At this writing, California, Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, and Texas
have all adopted grandparents' visitation statutes. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West
Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.151 (West Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572
(West Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1975); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 14.03(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1976).
28. See Gault, Grandparent-Grandchild Visitation, 37 TEX. B.J. 433, 437 (1974).
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Since legislative history surrounding the passage of the visitation statutes
is largely unavailable, it can only be speculated whether the state legislatures
could have anticipated the speed with which many thankful grandparents,
finally in court, would be out of it again. All of the statutes permit the
grandparents to sue for visitation privileges when their child has died and
the custodial parent subsequently refuses them access to their grandchild. In
such cases, the grandparents can present, in a habeas corpus proceeding, evi-
dence showing that visitation would be in the best interests of the grandchild-
ren. The court makes its findings of fact based on that evidence and any
countervailing evidence submitted by the custodial parents. The problem
arises, however, in those cases when the custodial parent has remarried and
the new spouse has adopted the child. 29  When the grandparents bring suit,
the stepparent argues that the state statutes that terminate all rights of blood
relatives upon the adoption of a child make the grandparents, in effect,
strangers to the child because they no longer have any legal relationship with
him.30  Despite the fact that these adoption statutes were enacted pri-
marily out of a concern for defining rights of succession, 31 their plain lan-
guage provides the adoptive parent with a formidable argument.
29. See, e.g., Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 795, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975); In re
Adoption of Berman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 687, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975); Lee v. Kepler, 197
So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v. Trosclair, 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975),
aff'g 303 So. 2d 926 (La. Ct. of App. 1974); In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by
M, 140 N.J. Super. 91, 355 A.2d 211 (1976); Geri v. Fanto, 79 Misc. 2d 947, 361
N.Y.S.2d 984 (Fam. Ct. 1974).
30. These statutes are frequently part of the state probate code and are primarily
concerned with succession rights. A typical example of such a statute is the District of
Columbia termination statute, D.C. CODE § 16-312(a) (1973), which provides:
A final decree of adoption establishes the relationship of natural parent and
natural child between adoptor and adoptee for all purposes, including mutual
rights of inheritance and succession as if adoptee were born to adoptor. The
adoptee takes from, through, and as representative of his adoptive parent or
parents in the same manner as a child by birth, and upon the death of an
adoptee intestate, his property shall pass and be distributed in the same manner
as if the adoptee had been born to the adopting parent or parents in lawful
wedlock. All rights and duties including those of inheritance and succession
between the adoptee, his natural parents, their issue, collateral relatives, and
so forth, are cut off, except that when one of the natural parents is the spouse
of the adoptor, the rights and relations as between adoptee, the natural parent,
and his parents and collateral relative, including mutual rights of inheritance
and succession, are in no wise altered.
31. One of the primary reasons that state legislatures enacted the termination statutes
was the confusion over the legal status of the adopted child because most adoption
statutes conferred on the adoptee all the legal rights of the natural child without
enumerating those rights. See generally Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 469-70, 501-16 (1971).
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The issue, admittedly complex, but one which had to be faced squarely
by the courts is whether an adoption statute or a grandparents' visita-
tion statute should prevail? Not all of the commentators in the jurisdic-
tions in which the grandparents' visitation statutes were passed viewed them
as enthusiastically as did the grandparents themselves.3 2 Similarly, the state
courts are divided in their approach to the problem of reconciling the two
statutes.
Texas, among others,3 3 opted for the preeminence of the adoption statute.
In DeWeese v. CrawfordA4 the grandparents sought visitation privileges with
their only natural grandchildren, in accordance with the state's recently en-
acted visitation statute.3 5  Their only son and his wife were divorced, and
custody had been given to the wife with visitation privileges granted to their
son. The grandparents' contact with their grandchildren had continued
through their son until his death. Thereafter the former wife's new husband
adopted the children and all access of the grandparents to their grandchildren
was denied. Confronted with this situation, the court considered the Texas
adoption statute3 0 controlling. Because the children had been adopted in
1973, the grandparents were not, as a matter of law, "paternal grandparents"
at the time the suit was instituted in 1974.37 They were found to possess
no legal relationship with the children because, according to the terms of the
adoption statute, all blood relationships ceased with adoption.3 8 The court
32. Duncan Gault, an articulate critic of the sweeping changes that the Texas Family
Code effectuated, foresaw that certain problems might arise as a result of the new
legislation. With regard to the grandparents' visitation section of Title 2, he voiced
particular concern over practical access to the child which would decrease per capita as
the right of access was expanded to include a wider range of persons. He also stressed
the difficulties inherent in sending a case of this nature to the jury. See Gault, supra
note 8, at 474; Gault, supra note 28, at 433.
33. See, e.g., Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v.
Trosclair, 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975).
34. 520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
35. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 14.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1976) provides in perti-
nent part: "[Tlhe court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the maternal or
paternal grandparents of the child and issue any necessary orders to enforce said de-
cree . ."
36. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46(a)(9) (Vernon 1969) provides in pertinent
part:
When a minor child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of this Arti-
cle, all legal relationship and all rights and duties between such child and
its natural parents shall cease and determine, and such child shall thereafter
be deemed and held to be for every purpose the child of its parent or parents
by adoption as fully as though naturally born to them in lawful wedlock . ...
37. 520 S.W.2d at 526.
38. See id. at 525-26. The Louisiana courts came to a similar conclusion in Smith v.
Trosclair, 321 So. 2d 514 (La. 1975). The grandparent's visitation statute, LA. REV.
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noted that the visitation statute did not act to restore a relationship eliminated
by the adoption statute.8 9
The holding in DeWeese, although arguably defensible in its legal reason-
ing, effectively eliminates the right of grandparents to sue for visitation rights
in Texas in any case in which the deceased or divorced parent has been dis-
placed by adoption. Since it can be assumed that adoption will occur in a
great number of cases, the Texas approach, which is also used by courts in
Florida and Louisiana, 40 makes a substantial incursion into the effect of visit-
ation statutes in those jurisdictions. Other courts, however, have been more
liberal in their construction of the statutes.
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD
The long range problem with the Texas court's approach is clearer in juxta-
position with the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Mimkon v. Ford.
4 1
The facts are similar: after the death of the child's natural mother, who had
been granted custody at the time of divorce, the natural father and his second
wife took custody and later adopted the child. When denied the right to
visit her grandchild, the maternal grandmother sued. Reading the statutes
42
STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West Supp. 1976), had to be reconciled with the adoption statute,
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 214 (West 1970). The court did not find the statutes
irreconcilable because the plaintiff grandparents were held to be divested of their legal
rights by the adoption statute.
39. One of the points raised by Duncan Gault is the constitutionality of conferring
visitation privileges on grandparents over the objections of a fit custodial parent. Mr.
Gault suggests that because this is state interference in the child-rearing process, such an
"encroachment" is an unconstitutional interference with the natural liberty of the parents
to direct the upbringing of their children. Gault, supra note 8, at 483, citing Odell v.
Lutz, 7t Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (1947). The DeWeese court rejected this con-
stitutional argument, noting that the key issue was the best interests of the child. The
court held that the state had a sufficient interest in the area of visitation rights to justify
statutory guidelines in this area. 520 S.W.2d at 526.
40. Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v. Trosclair, 321
So. 2d 514 (La. 1975).
41. 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975), rev'g 125 N.J. Super. 420, 311 A.2d 211
(1973).
42. The relevant statute at the time the case was heard provided:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this
State, is or are deceased, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child,
who is or are the parents of such deceased parent or parents, may apply to
the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought
before such court; and on the return thereof, the court may make such order
or judgment, as the best interest of the child may require for visitation rights
for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child.
1971 N.J. Laws, ch. 420 § 1 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West
1976)). The adoption statute at the time the case was decided, provided, in pertinent
part:
This act shall be administered so as to give effect to the public policy of
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in pari materia,4 3 the court made two relevant observations. First, the adopt-
ion statute is principally concerned with adoptions by persons other than rel-
atives of the children involved and was intended to protect the relationship
between the adopted child and its adoptive parents from interference by the
natural parents. 4 4  Since grandparents normally do not assume the role of
parental authority, their relationship with the children does not directly un-
dermine the authority of adoptive parents and, therefore, does not call for
such a harsh preventive remedy as termination of visitation rights. 45 Second,
because the visitation statute begins with the premise that either one or both
of the child's parents are deceased, divorced, or separated, the legislature
must have contemplated that the custodial parent might remarry and that
the new spouse might object to the continuing relationship between the grand-
parents and their grandchild. 4" Therefore, the legislature could not have in-
tended that the adoption statute should frustrate grandparents' rights.
The New Jersey court did not, of course, say that the grandparents would
always be awarded visitation rights, but rather that the possibility of ordering
visitation is not precluded by the adoption of the child by a stepparent and
this State to provide for the welfare of children requiring placement for adop-
tion and so as to promote policies and procedures which are socially necessary
and desirable for the protection of such children, their natural parents and
their adopting parents. To that end, it is necessary and desirable . . . (c)
to protect the adopting parents . . . from later disturbance of their relation-
ships to the child by the natural parents ....
1953 N.J. Laws, ch. 264 § 1 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-17 (West
1976)); and
The entry of a judgment of adoption shall terminate all relationships between
the child and his parents, and shall terminate all rights, duties and obligations
of any person which are founded upon such relationships, including rights
of inheritance under the intestate laws of this State; provided however, that
when the adopting parent is a stepfather or stepmother, and the adoption is
consummated with the consent and approval of the mother or father, respec-
tively, such adoption shall not affect or terminate any relationships between
the child and such mother or father.
1953 N.J. Laws, ch. 264 § 14 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30(A)
(1976)).
43. 66 N.J. at 433-34, 332 A.2d at 202-03. This principle of statutory construction
presumes that legislators are aware of prior legislation when they enact subsequent leg-
islation.
44. Id. at 434, 332 A.2d at 203. That interference most often takes shape in the
conflict between authority figures that disrupts and undermines the adoptive relationship.
45. Id. at 435-36, 332 A.2d at 204.
46. Id. at 436, 332 A.2d at 204. The court could not speak with certainty as to what
the legislators actually contemplated when they enacted the statute because legislative
history on the bill is unavailable. Consequently, the court's conclusion concerning
legislative intent was somewhat speculative.
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that a full examination of what is in the best interest of the child is the proper
procedure to make this determination.4 7
Even before New Jersey faced the question, New York courts were grap-
pling with two similarly worded statutes in Scranton v. Hutter.4s The trial
court disregarded earlier cases49 which held that an adoption order super-
seded any right the grandparents had under the visitation statute ° and made
a determination based on the facts presented by the parties. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, considered the legislative intent5 ' and concluded
47. Id. at 437, 332 A.2d at 205. The New Jersey courts recently refused to grant
visitation privileges to grandparents whose divorced son had visiting privileges with his
son who was in the mother's custody. Although the statute did create an independent
right of visitation in the grandparents in situations where the noncustodial parent has
been given visitation privileges, the court held that this right should seldom, if ever, be
granted. In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by M, 140 N.J. Super. 91, 355 A.2d
211 (1976).
Prior to this holding, Duncan Gault, a critic of the statutes permitting grandparents
to apply for court ordered visitation, had pointed out the problem caused by ambigu-
ously worded statutes. He believed the statutes created an impractical logistic situation:
six people with the right to judicial determination of their rights to visit with the child-
the father, the mother, and four grandparents. See Gault, supra note 8, at 484-85.
However, at this writing, In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by M is the only
case to have been heard in any of the jurisdictions with grandparents' visitation statutes
that has posed the problem envisioned by Gault. Thus his fears of expansive judicial
interpretation of dubious language have so far proved largely unfounded.
48. 40 App. Div. 2d 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1973).
49. People ex rel. Herman v. Lebovits, 66 Misc. 2d 830, 322 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup.
Ct. 1971); People ex rel. Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc. 2d 843, 283 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
50. At the time this case was decided, section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law
provided that the grandparents had the right to file a habeas corpus petition for visitation
rights with their grandchild. After both filing of the petition and notice to any parents
having custody of the child, the court could order visitation rights if the grandparents
had demonstrated that it was in the child's best interests to do so. 1966 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 631 § 1 (current version at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
51. When section 72 was originally passed in the form referred to in Scranton, As-
semblyman Noah Goldstein discussed the intent of the legislature in enacting it. Under
its terms, application for the visitation privilege could only be made when the child's par-
ent or parents were dead. Goldstein remarked that it was ironic that although grandpar-
ents could sue for custody, they could not apply for visitation rights. The legislature,
therefore, was attempting to remedy this injustice by providing for a court determination
of the benefit to the child of such visits. Goldstein expressed particular concern over
situations in which grandparents have lost their only child and then, because they have
no legal route to follow, have been cut off from their grandchildren as well. See 1966
N.Y. STATE LEGis. ANNUAL 14.
In 1975, section 72 was further amended to read:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this
State, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist
in which equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents
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that the right granted by the New York visitation statute was not automati-
cally nullified by a stepparent's adoption of the child. 52
In supplementing its legislative analysis the Scranton court relied in part
on the reasoning in the California case of Roquemore v. Roquemore.53  In
Roquemore, the court approached the problem from a slightly different per-
spective because of the peculiar facts of the case. Temporary visitation rights
had been awarded the grandparents prior to the stepparent's adoption of their
grandchild. Denied permission to intervene in the adoption, the grandpar-
ents had been assured by one department of the court that adoption would
not affect their visitation rights. Later when the adoption was granted, an-
other department of the same court dismissed the visitation action on the
basis that the grandparents' legal relationship with their grandchild had been
severed by the adoption.5 4 On appeal, the grandparents successfully argued
that the adoption should have no effect on their ability to institute an action
since the California visitation statute created an independent right of action
for them. 55
The court made a distinction between the termination of legal rights of
blood relatives upon adoption of the child for purposes of succession and the
severance of the bonds of affection and respect between blood relatives which
persist despite the finality of adoption.56  The court discussed the competing
of such child may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus
• . . for visitation rights . ..
(emphasis indicates the language added by the 1975 amendment). N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw
§ 72 (McKinney Supp. 1976). At the time the new section was added, Senator Leon
Giuffreda wrote a brief memorandum on the change, describing the broadening of the
court's jurisdiction to include situations other than the death of the child's parents as a
legislative attempt to give the courts greater flexibility in promoting the welfare of the
child. 1975 N.Y. STATE LEois. ANNUAL 51.
52. 40 App. Div. 2d at 299-300, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Arguably both the New York
and New Jersey courts were on firmer statutory ground than the Texas court in their
determination that the adoption statute was not controlling. In those states the particu-
lar statutory language that the courts had to interpret was more precise than in Texas.
53. 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1969).
54. Id. at 913, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
55. When this case was decided the California law read:
If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the
parents of such deceased person may be granted reasonable visitation rights
to the minor child during its minority by the superior court upon a finding
that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the minor child.
1967 Cal. Stats. ch. 276 § 1 (current version at CAL. Civ. CODE § 197.5 (West 1976)).
In 1973, this section was amended to extend the right to apply for visitation privileges
to the child's brothers, sisters, and great-grandparents. 1973 Cal. Stats., ch. 823 § 1
(1973). California is the only state that has granted judicially enforceable visitation
rights to a class of relatives much beyond grandparents.
56. The court quotes from section 257 of the California Probate Code (amended in
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relationships between the adoptive family and the natural family which fur-
ther complicate the visitation decision.57 It reversed the order that dismissed
the grandparents' complaint, holding that the grandparents were entitled to
visit their grandchildren if, as a matter of fact, such visits would be in the
best interests of the child and would not hinder the adoptive relationship.58
Strong policy reasons support the result reached by the New York, New
Jersey, and California courts. The purpose of the visitation statutes is to offer
the grandparents a remedy where one would not otherwise exist. The stat-
utes create an independent right of action that is not contingent on the rights
already given to the child's parents, either by common law or by legislative
enactment. The policy sought to be furthered is the continued relationship
between blood relatives.5 9 Psychologists are now concerned with the need
to preserve, rather than to disrupt, continuing relationships of the child and
are advocating a complete reevaluation of the standards used in child place-
ment and custody decisions.60 Reflecting these concerns, the statutes are de-
1955) which specifically limits that section to matters of succession, and thereby creates
the possibility that the status of a minor adoptee is not regulated for all purposes by its
terms. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 914, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
57. Id. at 914-15, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35. Some courts have been careful to
distinguish cases in which the new spouse of the natural parent adopts the child from
cases in which neither of the adoptive parents is the child's natural parent. Visitation
privileges may be granted in the former case but not in the latter. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 126 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1975) (maternal grandparents'
adoption of child cut off visitation rights of paternal grandparents).
58. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 917, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Accord, In re Adoption of
Berman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 687, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975); Vacula v. Blume, 384
N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. Div. 1976); Geri v. Fanto, 79 Misc. 2d 947, 361 N.Y.S.2d 984,
(Fam. Ct. 1974).
59. It is paradoxical that some courts are attempting to cut off the furtherance of
blood relationships by denying grandparents the right to access to their grandchildren
while others are being forced to unseal records of adoptions, since adoptees have been
held to have the right to know and communicate with their natural parents and other
blood relatives. For a full discussion of the constitutional considerations that mandate
the unsealing of such records, see Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to
Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196 (1975).
60. Commentators have expressed the need for courts involved in child placement to
recognize their responsibility to protect a child's psychological as well as physical
welfare. The crucial problem in this area is finding methods by which the law can
protect both by manipulating the child's external environment. The goal of any child
placement decision should be to insure the child an opportunity to be a fully loved and
fully accepted member of a family. Society's best interests demand that the needs of
the child be the primary determinant in custody situations. While some child place-
ment proposals stress improvement of traditional procedures for assuring minimal psy-
chological damage to the child when a custody decision is necessary, some rather radical
child placement proposals have also been advanced: custody determinations should be
absolute, not temporary; once custody is awarded to one parent, the other parent should
be barred from ever seeing or contacting the child again; and whenever an adult assumes
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signed to stabilize and shield a grandparent-grandchild relationship that is de-
monstrably beneficial to the child. From this point of view, the state has
a substantial interest in safeguarding the psychological well being of the child.
The adoption statutes on the other hand protect the newly formed family
relationship from outside interference. They promote a public policy in favor
of a strong central family unit, each of whose members has the right to a
stable daily life, unmarred by outside harrassment and repeated court appear-
ances. From this perspective, the state has a substantial interest in safe-
guarding the integrity of the family.
In considering the relative merits of the public policy favoring continued
relationships among blood relatives, the legislatures now seem to have struck
a realistic compromise. Viewing the statutes in their proper light, a court
would have the discretion to award visitation privileges to a child's natural
grandparents if it determined that these visits would be beneficial to the
child's development. Clearly relevant among the factors that should be con-
sidered in making such a determination would be the nature of the relation-
ship between the child and his grandparents, the nature of the relationship
between the child and his adoptive parents, and the nature of the relationship
between the grandparents and the adoptive parents. 61 To assume, as the
Texas court did in DeWeese, that adoption is a bar to judicial determination
of the desirability of grandparent-grandchild visitation 62 is to frustrate the
purpose for which the visitation statutes were enacted and to abrogate the
duties the state owes to the child.
IV. CONCLUSION
The grandparents' visitation rights statutes established an independent
right in a child's grandparents to utilize state habeas corpus proceedings to
the role of psychological parent to the child, severing that relationship by interference
from the biological parents should be prohibited. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 1-19, 32-34, 37-45
(1973).
61. A factor that ought to be a prime consideration in awarding visitation rights is the
preference of the child. Many courts have recognized that a child of sufficient age,
intelligence, and maturity should have significant input into the custody decisionmaking
process. Most jurisdictions, either by legislative enactment or judicial decision, treat the
wishes of the child as a relevant factor in custody cases. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 142
Colo. 420, 351 P.2d 387 (1960) (per curiam); Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1963) (per curiam); Tobler v. Tobler, 78 Idaho 218, 299 P.2d 490 (1956);
Holley v. Holley, 158 So. 2d 620 (La. Ct. of App. 1963). See generally Annot., 4
A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965). It is arguable that the same rationale should apply in habeas
corpus petitions of grandparents under visitation statutes.
62. See 520 S.W.2d at 526. It should be noted that DeWeese was decided prior to
the revision of Texas' adoption statute, and the court did not decide if the same rule
would apply under the revised statute. Id,
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force an impartial evaluation of their request for visitation privileges with
their grandchild. In doing so, the statutes took positive steps to protect estab-
lished relationships with relatives who love the child and care about his wel-
fare. The child whose parents are divorced or whose parent has died has
already had his life disrupted and disorganized. It is incumbent upon the
state to help preserve what little continuity may be left by allowing the grand-
parents to maintain healthy relationships previously established with the
child. To this end, application of the "best interests of the child" standard
is an equitable and rational method of determining grandparent visitation.
The fundamental difference between these statutes and the common law
is, in a sense, a procedural one: a shift in the method of determining the
best interests of the child. The decisionmaking power is shifted from the
parents to the courts, thus removing the problem posed by the dual roles of
interested party and ultimate arbiter that parents have played under the com-
mon law. On balance, the more objective analysis by the courts of what is
in the best interests of the child should provide a more satisfactory solution
to the difficult problem of determining grandparents' visitation rights.
Legislatures which have recognized the problem and have enacted statutes
to solve it have the continuing responsibility to assure that the exercise of
these newly granted rights is not thwarted by conflicting legislation, such as
that terminating the rights of blood relatives when a child is adopted. Leg-
islatures which have not yet recognized the need for grandparents' visitation
statutes will have to face this larger issue as more and more children become
pawns in bitter custody and visitation fights and judicially frustrated grand-
parents demand the basic right to a hearing on their complaints. It is only
with responsive, responsible, and conscientiously drafted legislation and a
concurrent awareness in the courts of the spirit of such legislative enactments
that the establishment of the rights of grandparents to continue satisfying and
mutually beneficial relationships with their grandchildren will be secure.
Phyllis C. Borzi
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